Using behavioural science to
help fight the coronavirus. ESRI Working Paper No. 656
March 2020 by Lunn, Pete et al.
Using behavioural science to 
help fight the coronavirus
Pete Lunn, Cameron Belton, Ciarán Lavin, Féidhlim 
McGowan, Shane Timmons and Deirdre Robertson
ESRI working papers represent un-refereed work-in-progress by researchers who are solely responsible for 
the content and any views expressed therein. Any comments on these papers will be welcome and should be 
sent to the author(s) by email. Papers may be downloaded for personal use only. 
Working Paper No. 656 
 March 2020 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Using Behavioural Science to Help Fight the Coronavirus 
 
 
 
 
 
Pete Lunn, Cameron Belton, Ciarán Lavin, Féidhlim McGowan,  
Shane Timmons and Deirdre Robertson 
 
 
 
 
Behavioural Research Unit, ESRI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: The authors thank Liam Delaney and Karl Purcell for pointing us to 
additional material and for insightful comments on an initial draft. We are also grateful to 
Alan Barrett and Helen Russell for helpful feedback and guidance.  
 2 
 
 
Summary 
This paper summarises useful evidence from behavioural science for fighting the COVID-19 
outbreak. It is based on an extensive literature search of relevant behavioural interventions 
and studies of crises. The findings aim to be useful not only to government and public 
authorities, but to organisations, workplaces and households. Seven issues are covered: 
(1) Evidence on handwashing shows that education and information are not enough. Placing 
hand sanitisers and colourful signage in central locations (e.g. directly beyond doors, canteen 
entrances, the middle of entrance halls and lift lobbies) increases use substantially. All 
organisations and public buildings could adopt this cheap and effective practice. (2) By 
contrast, we lack direct evidence on reducing face touching. Articulating new norms of 
acceptable behaviour (as for sneezing and coughing) and keeping tissues within arm’s reach 
could help. (3) Isolation is likely to cause some distress and mental health problems, 
requiring additional services. Preparedness, through activating social networks, making 
concrete isolation plans, and becoming familiar with the process, helps. These supports are 
important, as some people may try to avoid necessary isolation. (4) Public-spirited 
behaviour is most likely when there is clear and frequent communication, strong group 
identity, and social disapproval for those who don’t comply. This has implications for 
language, leadership and day-to-day social interaction. (5) Authorities often overestimate the 
risk of panic, but undesirable behaviours to watch out for are panic buying of key supplies 
and xenophobic responses. Communicating the social unacceptability of both could be part of 
a collective strategy. (6) Evidence links crisis communication to behaviour change. As well 
as speed, honesty and credibility, effective communication involves empathy and promoting 
useful individual actions and decisions. Using multiple platforms and tailoring message to 
subgroups are beneficial too. (7) Risk perceptions are easily biased. Highlighting single 
cases or using emotive language will increase bias. Risk is probably best communicated 
through numbers, with ranges to describe uncertainty, emphasising that numbers in the 
middle are more likely. Stating a maximum, e.g. “up to X thousand”, will bias public 
perception.  
A final section discusses possibilities for combining these insights, the need for simplicity, 
the role of the media, and possibilities for rapid pretesting.  
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Introduction 
There is great uncertainty about the scale of the epidemic due to transmission of the 
coronavirus that causes the disease COVID-19. We cannot know how many people will 
become infected and how many of them may die.1 We do know that multiple measures can be 
taken that are likely to reduce transmission of the virus and ultimately, therefore, to save 
lives.2,3 Many of these measures involve good organisation of health services – resources for 
contact tracing4,5, procedures for handling phone calls to GP practices, transportation for 
people who need to be tested, availability of isolation beds, etc.6 Others are designed to 
change the decision making and behaviour of citizens – improving handwashing and 
hygiene7, etiquette for sneezes and coughs, knowing when and how to self-isolate, etc.8,9 
The present paper concerns this second set of measures, those designed to affect decision 
making and behaviour. Recent decades have seen increases in the quantity and quality of 
research in behavioural science. In the last ten years, this science has been increasingly 
applied to policy problems by governments and international organisations around the 
world.10 Consequently, there is a body of applied scientific knowledge and evidence that can 
be called upon in the fight against COVID-19. This paper reviews relevant evidence and 
some of the lessons therein.  
The aim is to distil the evidence into a paper to inform those trying to fight the disease. Some 
of the evidence is relevant to mass communication of public health information from 
governments and authorities. Other evidence concerns the design of local behavioural 
interventions to reduce transmission of the disease. An important point is that useful 
behavioural interventions can be put in place not only by relevant national and local 
authorities, but by individual organisations, workplaces and even households. Our everyday 
lives are the context in which transmission of the virus takes place and much of behavioural 
science concerns how context affects our decision making and behaviour. Given the 
nonlinear dynamics of infection, reduced transmission can ultimately lower the overall 
number who contract the disease and the number of cases at the peak of the epidemic, when 
health services will be most stretched.11 
Some caveats are necessary. The paper has been produced much more rapidly and at shorter 
notice than would be standard for research of this type. Obviously, this is because time 
matters in fighting the virus, but it means that the team have had to trade thoroughness off 
against speed, at least to some extent. In negotiating this trade-off, we have striven to 
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prioritise accuracy. The main issue is that there are likely to be some important studies or 
ideas that are missing. 
The paper is organised into seven sections: (1) Hand Washing; (2) Face Touching; (3) 
Entering and Coping with Isolation; (4) Encouraging Collective Action; (5) Avoiding 
Undesirable Behaviour; (6) Crisis Communication; (7) Risk Perception. Each section 
describes available evidence, with a final paragraph that draws conclusions. The final section 
summarises these and highlights some more general implications also. 
1.  Handwashing 
Behaviour change interventions that target everyday activities must overcome a common and 
substantial barrier: habits. Habits are highly efficient, designed to free up our minds to 
concentrate on other matters. By definition, habits operate mostly outside conscious 
awareness and are hence hard to break through improved education and knowledge. For 
instance, even in acute healthcare environments, attempts to improve hand hygiene and other 
infection control behaviours through education and awareness have limited and short-term 
impacts.12,13 
There is, however, a body of evidence about which interventions do work. On the downside, 
much of the research takes place in hospital and other healthcare settings, whereas the 
COVID-19 response requires behaviour change also in homes, workplaces, public buildings, 
etc. On the upside, evidence does suggest how to design good interventions.   
A 2001 review of research in hospitals found that combining educational interventions with 
reminders and better facilities (e.g. automated sinks) can increase handwashing.14 A 2012 
follow-up also concluded that multiple behavioural levers are required, including social 
influence, convenience, prompts, and cues.15 Later studies point to benefits from placing 
alcohol-based hand sanitiser (AHS) in highly visible locations.16,17 Indeed, a crucial aspect of 
successful handwashing interventions is to capture attention. Placing an AHS stand in the 
middle (versus the side) of a hospital entrance lobby increased usage substantially.18 More 
visible, proximate and convenient locations for AHS dispensers increases their use,19 more so 
than increasing the number of dispensers.20 Another study increased use by deploying 
flashing lights to draw attention to the AHS.21 
While fewer interventions have been studied outside healthcare settings, some have been 
successful. A 2018 review of research in office workplaces found that simple provision of 
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hand hygiene products, accompanied by education on how to use them, usually resulted in 
significant improvements in hand hygiene compliance.22 Modest increases in soap use in 
public toilets can be obtained via written signs.23 Towel and soap dispensers that do not 
require user activation also help.24 Messages linked to disgust tend to be effective,25,26,27,28,29 
while evidence does not support messages that communicate social norms (“4 out of 5 people 
wash their hands every time…”).30,31  
Evidence from multiple studies points to useful conclusions. Education and information are 
not sufficient to change habits; interventions need to attract attention and make compliance 
convenient. Thus, AHS is an important tool. Evidence supports a policy in which 
organisations of all types placed colourful AHS stands directly in front of entrances and 
centrally in lobbies, lift areas, canteens.  
2.  Face Touching 
In contrast to handwashing, we can find no proper scientific studies that evaluate 
interventions designed to reduce the frequency with which people touch their face. 
Observational studies suggest that people touch their mouth, nose or eyes perhaps 10-20 
times per hour.32,33 When people are asked to self-record face touching, it increases rather 
than decreases it,34 meaning that making people self-conscious may backfire. 
The issue of face touching raises the question of how to encourage a specific behaviour in the 
absence of direct evidence. Behavioural scientists have developed guides to behaviour change 
interventions that draw general lessons from across domains. The “Behaviour Change 
Wheel”35 centres on a model of behaviour change consisting of three essential elements: 
capability, opportunity and motivation. Individuals have to be psychologically or physically 
able to undertake the behaviour, the environment that surrounds them needs to facilitate the 
behaviour, and their own mental processes need to energise and direct the behaviour. Authors 
of this approach have issued some material specific to the coronavirus.36 The EAST 
framework37 emphasises that behaviour change is more likely when the behaviour is made 
Easy, Attractive, Social and Timely.  
What is common to these frameworks is recognition that education and information is not 
enough; we need to alter physical and social environments as well as understanding and 
mindset. With respect to face touching, a physical intervention might be to place tissues in 
prominent locations, e.g. immediately before the keyboard for office workers, on lunch and 
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coffee tables, so that people can use them and not their hands to scratch an itch. A social 
intervention might be for the public health authorities to encourage a specific change in social 
acceptability, perhaps that scratching with a sleeve is fine, just as it is now advised to sneeze 
or cough into the elbow or upper arm rather than the hand. The UK Behavioural Insights 
Team has made similar suggestions.38 
3.  Entering and Coping with Isolation 
Part of the necessary response to the COVID-19 outbreak is to limit social contact, 
particularly with those who display symptoms or are at increased risk of having contracted 
the virus. While self-isolation can help to contain and control the spread of infectious 
diseases,39 isolation has important negative psychological effects, which we describe here. 
Awareness of these consequences is important to help people prepare and, where possible, 
prevent them. The behavioural science literature also suggests that anticipation of these 
effects could affect compliance with self-isolation.  
It is well-established in the psychology and public health literature that social isolation has 
detrimental consequences for wellbeing, with effects comparable to other well-known risk 
factors such as smoking.40 Loneliness is also associated with increased risk for mental health 
problems, including depression and anxiety.41,42  
A recent review of 24 studies, in which individuals were quarantined for durations ranging 
from several days to several weeks, sheds light on possible consequences.43 While distress 
and irritability from lack of social contact, loss of freedom and boredom during quarantine 
might be expected, some studies indicate long-term effects,44 including depressive 
symptoms45 and substance dependence46 up to three years after quarantine has ended. The 
review highlighted specific implications for healthcare workers, who can become concerned 
about failing to support co-workers during the outbreak,47 can be stigmatised following 
quarantine,48 and sometimes self-isolate beyond the quarantine period.49  
The duration of isolation is important. Longer periods are associated with poorer mental 
health outcomes50 and increased anger.49 Extending the isolation period beyond initial 
suggestions can demoralise people and increase non-compliance.51 Thus, clarity and certainty 
about timelines are both important. 
The mental health effects of loneliness during isolation can be exacerbated by loss of routine, 
which is linked to multiple negative mental health consequences.52 Protective behaviours 
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such as sleep53 and exercise54 routines can be disrupted and hindered during isolation. 
Children may be especially susceptible to such changes in routine.55    
Planning for the effects of social isolation can help individuals to cope. Plans may be put in 
place to remotely engage with social networks, via phone and video calls, or social media. 
Activating social networks may be particularly important for those living alone. People can 
maintain aspects of routine that remain possible during isolation, such as keeping alarms set 
to usual times, maintaining working hours, and planning home-based exercise (for those well 
enough). Plans are easier to follow if they are time-specific and intentional, rather than 
general aspirations.36,56 Creating plans in advance of isolation, discussing plans with others 
and incorporating familiar routines may help people to overcome anxiety. Familiarity and 
repeated “mere” exposure to choices is established to reduce uncertainty and promote 
positivity towards those choices.57 
A danger is that perceived negative consequences of isolation could hinder voluntary 
engagement. When deciding whether to engage with proposed health solutions, people 
consider not only their susceptibility to the threat and its severity, but how effective they 
perceive the solution to be and the nature of the required behaviour.58 For instance, some 
people actively avoid receiving important medical information when it might lead to an 
undesirable action, such as learning that they might need surgery.59,60 People express 
unwillingness to isolate themselves when they harbour doubts about the chances of infecting 
others, but report greater willingness when they consider the possible effect on the most 
vulnerable in society.61 Thus, if people anticipate and fear negative consequences of self-
isolation, or fail to reflect on spreading the virus to those most at risk, they may downplay or 
not acknowledge symptoms of COVID-19, to avoid the possibility of isolation.  
Overall, evidence suggests negative mental health consequences from isolation. The 
implication is that authorities need to supply and advertise additional mental health services, 
including support lines and advice, for people who undergo isolation. Helping people to 
create plans is likely to help. This includes encouraging people to inform social media 
networks that they are isolated, encouraging messages and calls, and maintaining some 
routine. Familiarising people with the process and ways to cope with it is likely to increase 
compliance. Highlighting the altruistic rationale for isolation may reduce stigma and increase 
compliance, as considered further in the next section. 
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4.  Encouraging Collective Action 
The behavioural response to COVID-19 is unavoidably collective. Each person’s chance of 
contracting the virus depends not only on their own behaviour, but also on the behaviour of 
their fellow citizens. Initial data show that young people face a substantially lower risk of 
succumbing to COVID-19 than older people,62 yet willingness to adapt their behaviour will, 
in turn, influence how many older people get the virus.63  
Similar problems have been studied for many decades under multiple labels (“public good 
games”, “social dilemmas”, “collective action problems”, “common pool resource games”). 
Whatever label one chooses, there are replicable empirical results that suggest ways to 
increase the likelihood that people do the right thing by their fellow citizens. 
It was demonstrated some time ago that many, though not all, individuals will override self-
interest and act in the collective interest.64,65 Perhaps a majority of the population are what are 
referred to as “conditional co-operators”,66,67 who are willing to make sacrifices for the public 
good provided that others are too, but cease co-operation if too many other people don’t 
bother. There is some evidence that such co-operative behaviour is more likely in response to 
emergencies.68,69  
Large scientific literatures now reveal when public-spirited behaviour is more or less likely. 
We highlight three factors: communication, group identity and punishment. Importantly, 
while the relevant evidence was initially demonstrated in laboratory experiments, is has since 
been verified in multiple real-world applications.70  
A consistent finding is that co-operation is improved, often substantially, by 
communication.71 Co-operation is increased by clear statements, articulated by leaders and 
repeated by others, of a desired collective behaviour that is in the group interest. This can 
enhance trust, establish social norms and encourage individuals to commit to the behaviour.72 
Observation of effective communication when facing social dilemmas reveals that it is the 
articulation of how the behaviour is best for all, rather than persuasion to undertake the 
specific behaviour, that most supports co-operation.73 This evidence, for instance, suggests 
that one of the most effective arguments to promote compliance with isolation is that self-
isolation in response to symptoms is the best way for all of us to prevent infecting each other. 
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The more people feel part of a group or community response, the more likely they are to 
make a selfless contribution.70 This finding is particularly true of responses to threats, which 
generate a stronger public response when framed in group rather than individual terms.74 
Co-operation is more likely when there is transparency about individuals’ contributions and 
punishment for those who do not pull their weight.75 This punishment need not be material, 
but can simply consist of social disapproval,76 although there is evidence that where 
punishment is itself unjust or antisocial, it can backfire.77,78  
This evidence relating to collective action has implications for fighting COVID-19. Our 
situation is collective, not only at the international or national level, but within localities, 
workplaces and households. In each of these overlapping social groups, strong 
communication of a common strategy to fight the disease is likely to increase adherence to 
prescribed behaviours. Language and leadership matters. Where behaviour is about “we” and 
“us” rather than “I” or “you”, more public-spirited responses are likely. Media reporting 
matters too. Faithfully reporting that people are trying to follow advice, assuming that they 
are, is as important as highlighting failures to follow it. Conditional co-operators need to 
know that others are co-operating. Nevertheless, where behaviour falls short, a reasonable 
degree of disapproval is helpful; polite but clear interventions when official advice is not 
followed are likely to improve behaviour. We are in this together.    
5.  Avoiding Undesirable Behaviour 
Neglecting to wash hands, failing to cover coughs or sneezes, or avoiding self-isolation at the 
first genuine sign of symptoms, all constitute poor behaviour relative to ideal standards in 
response to the coronavirus epidemic. Nevertheless, these behaviours can be distinguished 
from more antisocial behaviours. Among such behaviours are panic responses, undue 
expressions of anger towards officials or health workers, xenophobic responses to people of a 
race or nationality perceived to be high-risk, or unsympathetic responses to those who 
contract the virus.  
Encouragingly, studies suggest that mutual assistance is a more common response to a crisis 
than mass panic and social disorder.79,80 The relative recent experience with swine flu (H1N1) 
is a case in point.81,82 Nevertheless, severe social and economic disturbances can occur in 
response to disease outbreak.83 Overreaction is not limited to the public, but can also affect 
professionals and workers in healthcare systems.84,85   
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Multiple studies have investigated responsible versus irresponsible media coverage, and its 
effects on public perceptions. The method is generally to analyse content for exaggeration or 
alarming language, or to relate media volume, content and tone to public opinion surveys. An 
initial analysis of the worldwide coverage of the coronavirus has raised concerns about 
unhelpful, alarming language, such as “killer virus”.86 However, a recent review of research 
into swine flu coverage concluded that while there was some evidence of overdramatization, 
the bigger issue was the focus on reporting the threat (number of diagnoses, etc.) at the 
expense of communicating how best to fight the disease.87  
We can find surprisingly little high-quality evidence on the drivers of panic buying and or 
efforts to prevent it. Despite its name, panic buying is not always driven by strong emotions, 
but can be a natural response of risk-averse individuals to a threat of future unavailability or 
lack of access (e.g. due to isolation).88 Evidence from studies of financial behaviour suggests 
that it is more likely when individuals observe others stocking up.89 In effect, stockpiling 
amounts to antisocial behaviour in a large-scale “common pool resource” problem. We have 
to rely on encouraging responsible behaviour, especially in relation to hand sanitisers and 
other medical supplies. In line with the previous section, this requires articulating a clear 
strategy and expectation of behaviour that we all need to comply with.    
An important concern is the possibility that specific social groups perceived to be associated 
with the virus might face discrimination or ostracization.90 For instance, Asian-Americans 
experienced discrimination during the SARS epidemic.91 In general, people who feel more 
vulnerable to disease express more negative reactions to out-groups92 and priming people to 
think about disease increases ethnocentrism.93 To combat this, strong messages from leaders 
might stress both the social unacceptability of any xenophobic behaviour and the importance 
of understanding that different people face the same threat and share a common goal.94 
In summary, there is evidence from past crises that public authorities can overestimate the 
likelihood of panic and public disorder, including the role of the media in propagating it. 
There are nevertheless known risks of panic buying and xenophobic behaviour. Evidence 
suggests that clear leadership and statements about the unacceptability of such behaviour are 
required, as part of our collective response as a society, coupled with visible use of available 
punishments for people who transgress.         
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6.  Crisis Communication 
A scientific literature covers how people respond to crisis communication and aims to 
identify the best ways to communicate in a crisis. Although many studies are specific to 
single countries or incidents, useful principles emerge. These may be helpful not only for 
national communication but across the public health system, to balance the need to inform 
and motivate against the danger of inciting unnecessary fear.95  
The word “unnecessary” is important here, because fear is to some extent a legitimate force 
that can positively influence attitudes, intentions and behaviours.96 There is evidence that 
communication of threat is particularly effective when combined with communication about 
how to respond. There is an ongoing scientific debate about whether ‘fear appeals’ generate 
long-term behaviour change. However, the consensus is that they are more effective when 
perceptions of self-efficacy (belief that one’s own actions make a difference) are high.97,98  
Messages can be designed to elicit emotions other than fear. Evidence shows that ‘empathy 
appeals’ can have positive impacts on behaviour change.99 In the context of smoking, social 
marketing that portrays realistic narratives involving loss or pain within personal 
relationships can be as or more persuasive than graphic ‘fear appeals’. Similar empathetic 
framing may strengthen belief that a community working together can do something to 
mitigate the effects of a crisis.100,101 
Different subgroups can respond differently to communication during a crisis, which can be 
important for more vulnerable groups102 but also helpful for good crisis communication. 
Making communication sensitive to the demographics of the intended recipient helps people 
to feel that society is more prepared.103 Messages specific to ethnic groups can also improve 
engagement.104 For example, African American women were more likely to test for HIV after 
viewing a video featuring a presenter matching their gender, and more likely still when the 
context of the messages were framed in a culturally relevant way. 105 
Marketing researchers have noted that public health campaigns are more effective when they 
apply principles that are successfully used by private companies – be distinctive, consistent, 
engaging and relevant. For example, catchy phrases or mnemonics help children and families 
to retain important public health information.106 The Australian ‘Slip, Slop, Slap’ sun 
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protection campaign is a prime example of the widespread, lasting impact on behaviour that 
campaigns which incorporate these principles can achieve.107 
Social media has opened new avenues for communication108 and offers potential for rapid 
information dissemination.109 It can be harnessed to promote altruistic behaviour. Messages 
that convey a moral imperative for people to act and messages that evoke strong emotional 
reactions are more likely to be shared.110  Campaigns that invoke an internally sourced 
‘intrinsic’ motivation to help others generally last longer than ones that leverage extrinsic 
incentives to do ‘good’.111 
However, there is generally mixed evidence on the benefits of social media in crises. 
Following the 2015 MERS (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome) coronavirus outbreak in 
South Korea, those exposed to information on social media were more likely to experience 
fear and anger, but both emotions were positively associated with the extent of subsequent 
preventive behaviours.112 In relation to the Zika and Ebola viruses, studies have suggested 
that use of social media messaging by authorities may not be beneficial for knowledge,113 can 
reduce perceptions of credibility114 and may increase focus on panic and uncertainty.115  
The US federal agency, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), has previously 
distilled evidence into six guiding principles for crisis communication.116 These are: (1) Be 
first: provide information as soon as possible or, if not possible, explain how you are working 
to get it and when. (2) Be right: tell people what you know when you know it, tell them what 
you don't know, and tell them if you will know later. (3) Be credible: tell the truth. (4) 
Express empathy: acknowledge what people are feeling.  (5) Promote action: give people 
relevant things to do. (6) Show respect: involve stakeholders in decision making processes 
and try to meet media deadlines. 
Some messages pass through the media filter more easily than others. These principles 
closely map onto those tested in a content analysis of US media stories that concerned 
foodborne illnesses and natural disasters.117 This found a strong tendency for news outlets to 
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focus on information and explanation, with little coverage of expressions of empathy, 
although the above evidence suggests empathy is important during crises. 
The evidence provides some clear principles for communicating health crisis information. In 
addition to speed, honesty and credibility, it is important to stress the usefulness of individual 
actions and decisions. Empathy matters – people need reassurance that those in charge 
understand how they feel. Using multiple platforms and tailoring some key messages to 
subgroups is likely to be beneficial too, although social media has not generally proved 
effective for official communication during outbreaks. 
7.  Risk Perception 
A primary role of government and authorities during an epidemic is to inform citizens about 
risk. From a behavioural perspective, this is difficult territory. The evidence below 
demonstrates that risk perceptions are easily biased. Downplaying risk may undermine efforts 
to change behaviour, but overstating it could increase economic and social costs. Moreover, 
different people have different tolerance for risk; there is no “right” response to a given level 
of risk. 
While not unchallengeable, the assumption we make here is that authorities (and others) 
should communicate the risks surrounding COVID-19 to the public as faithfully as possible. 
The rationale for this assumption is threefold. First, to do otherwise is antidemocratic. People 
must rely on the authorities to give them an accurate picture on which to base decisions. 
Second, trust is a vital ingredient of public-spirited behaviour. Exaggeration or downplaying 
risk could damage trust, which needs to be maintained over the course of an epidemic. Third, 
if government is seen to manipulate perceptions of risk, it gives others licence to do likewise, 
including businesses and the media, for whom risk perceptions may have commercial 
consequences, good or bad. In short, at times like this, truth is a public good.    
The issue is important because there is good evidence from meta-analyses to suggest that risk 
perception does drive behavioural responses, both in general118 and in relation to health 
behaviours such as vaccination.119 Moreover, following a change in behaviour, people tend to 
adjust their perception of risk downwards.120 However, individuals struggle to perceive risks 
accurately and distort probability when making decisions,121 with substantial differences 
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between individuals.122 Nevertheless, many effects are known and can be taken into 
consideration when trying to communicate risk faithfully.   
People judge the likelihood of an outcome partly by how easily it springs to mind.123 This 
“availability heuristic” biases perceptions of lethal risks, increasing the perceived likelihood 
of evocative outcomes and those emphasised by the media.124 Perceptions of risk and 
protective behaviours tend to track the volume of coverage on traditional and social media.125 
Risks are judged to be greater when they have more emotional impact – the “affect 
heuristic”.126,127 Fear tends to increase perception of risk, while anger can reduce it.128 
Availability and affect heuristics can operate together.129 Overall, there is no established 
dynamic for how risks to the public are perceived over time; some provoke excessive 
response, others insufficient.130         
A bias that may be particularly important for authorities during a crisis is “hindsight bias”. 
Information regarding the coronavirus is evolving all the time, leading to constant revisions 
of  assessments. Compared to their assessment beforehand, people generally believe that an 
outcome was always more likely once they know that it happened.131,132 Over months, or 
even weeks, this may lead to a perception that the authorities “should have known” where 
events were heading, when in reality uncertainty was great. Being clear about the extent of 
uncertainty and reminding people of that uncertainty may be important for credibility. 
Knowing these biases, one might strive to communicate numeric estimates of risk. People 
trust numbers more and most (but not all) people prefer them.133,134 However, even numbers 
can be framed in ways that make risks appear larger or smaller.135,136 This includes positive 
and negative framing (e.g. 2% mortality versus 98% survival),137 leading some to argue that 
both should be used.138  
An important issue is how to communicate uncertainty. The impact of COVID-19 is, and will 
remain, hard to assess. Hindsight bias is likely as the situation becomes clearer. Stating a 
cautious range is one solution. However, a trade-off exists: ranges imply honesty, but can 
undermine the perceived expertise of decision-makers.139 In addition, many people think of 
the distribution underlying a range as uniform, like drawing lottery balls, rather than 
understanding that numbers near the middle are more likely.140  
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Given the above, evidence does not provide an uncontested “best practice” for 
communicating public health risks,141,142 but there are lessons. These include not using 
specific or extreme cases, avoiding emotive language (beyond expressing empathy), sticking 
dispassionately to numbers. Communicating uncertainty via ranges is honest, but it should be 
emphasised that the middle is most likely. Stating ranges as maximums (“anything up to X”) 
will exacerbate upward bias. While the aim here is primarily to inform authorities, these 
lessons apply equally to media reporting.  
General Discussion  
The evidence described and interpreted in this paper has been rapidly assembled to address 
seven areas where behavioural science can make a constructive contribution to the fight 
against COVID-19. The evidence varies in volume and strength and, therefore, in the 
definitiveness with which conclusions can be drawn. For instance, findings on placement of 
hand sanitisers straightforwardly point to practices that, if made sufficiently widespread, will 
be likely to slow transmission. Implications in other areas, such as effective crisis 
communication, are more nuanced and reached on the balance of probabilities. It is important 
to note, however, that the results relating to highly specific and localised behaviours, such as 
increased handwashing, are not generally stronger or more reliable than those surrounding 
more general behaviours, such as public-spirited actions. In fact, the findings that collective 
action is more effective when there is communication, group identity and punishment, are 
some of the strongest and most replicable findings in behavioural science.       
The final paragraph of each section presented conclusions in each of the seven areas, which 
are not repeated in this final section. Instead, this discussion pulls together some general 
lessons that arise when evidence is considered across the different areas. Four issues are 
considered: the combination of behavioural effects, the need for simplicity, the role of the 
media, and possibilities for deploying rapid pre-testing.    
The opportunity for combining behavioural interventions can be illustrated by the experience 
of one of the authors when attending a Dublin hospital a few days after the first case of 
COVID-19 was confirmed in Ireland. Inside the main revolving door was a large, red “stop” 
sign, modelled on the equivalent road sign. It was unmissable and marked the hand sanitiser. 
At the reception desk, before saying anything else, the receptionist politely asked everyone 
“have you used the hand sanitiser?” Most people confidently replied “yes”, some hesitated 
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before unconvincingly forcing out a “yes”, a few apologised and went to use it. There were 
additional salient sanitisers placed in the most public spaces: by, and in, the lifts, and at 
entrances to each consultant clinic. This is how to use behavioural evidence to fight the virus. 
An intervention known to be effective was combined with a method to capture attention, 
enforcement of a social norm, and likely social disapproval for those who don’t co-operate 
because interventions were in the most public spaces in the building.      
Organisations wishing to play their part in tackling COVID-19 can all do similarly. In 
addition, they can use language that stresses and reinforces the collective nature of action 
required from staff and visitors, communicate preparedness for the possibility of cases in 
their domain, provide tissues on workbenches and next to keyboards, and ensure continued 
communication with anyone unfortunate enough to face isolation. In combination, evidence 
implies that these behavioural interventions, and perhaps others, can substantially slow 
transmission.  
There is one important additional behavioural principle to keep in mind. Across multiple 
areas of behavioural science, there are often benefits to be had from keeping things simple.143 
Even when strongly motivated, people cannot process and retain large volumes of 
information; mental bandwidth is limited. This is important for national communication, 
where a focus on just three or four crucial behaviours (hand washing, face touching, cough 
and sneeze etiquette, self-isolation) has probably been effective. The principle is inherent in 
the hospital intervention described above. Each intervention was simple and sequentially 
separated, likely to generate a result far more effective than a more complex poster or leaflet 
explaining the benefits of hand-washing.    
Looking across the seven areas surveyed by this paper, the effectiveness of communication 
stands out as a crucial issue in generating desirable behaviour. Yet a large proportion of 
communication from public authorities, naturally, passes through the filter of the media. 
Several findings covered in the body of this paper apply. In particular, there is evidence that 
there is much more reporting on the latest levels of threat than on actions that people can and 
should take to reduce it, or on utterances of responsible individuals that may communicate 
empathy or credibility – factors that evidence suggests are important to subsequent 
behaviour. One can make a reasonable case that during a health crisis such as this, the role of 
the media should change somewhat, as it does during other periods, such as elections. There 
may be personal and societal benefits to giving more time than usual to advice, constructive 
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personal actions and direct communications between authorities and citizens. This can be 
done without affecting the ability of the media to fulfil its functions in faithfully reporting 
events and holding the powerful to account.  
Finally, one growing and important aspect of the growth in applied behavioural science 
requires mention. A number of the studies cited here exemplify the possibilities for pre-
testing behavioural interventions for effectiveness. Even when time is short and authorities 
are responding quickly, this may be possible.144 Rapid online testing of comprehension and 
public responses to health materials can be undertaken to support the development of the best 
materials.  
At the time of writing, unfortunately, it seems that this virus will afflict people around the 
world for the coming months and perhaps years. There will be multiple opportunities for 
behavioural science to contribute to the fight against it. We hope that this paper has made an 
initial contribution to that effort.     
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